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A Secret Weapon?: Applying Privacy 
Doctrine to the Second Amendment 
by JODY LYNEÉ MADEIRA*
For the past 80 years privacy has been of increasingly important legal 
concern.  In 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Public Utilities 
Commission of the District of Columbia et al. v. Pollak et al.1 that plaintiffs 
had no legal right to avoid radio broadcasts in Washington, D.C. city trolleys 
and buses.  The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished a bus, a public space, from 
a home, a private space, and ruled that the broadcasts were not inconsistent 
with public convenience, comfort, or safety because individuals in public are 
“subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights of others.”2  The 
lone dissenter, Justice William Douglas, urged, “Liberty . . . must mean 
more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include 
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom.  The right to be let alone 
is indeed the beginning of all freedom.”3
Over ensuing decades, the Supreme Court has continued to wrangle 
with privacy and its boundaries in many contexts.  Women have a 
fundamental right to reproductive freedom, including contraceptive use, 
freedom from involuntary sterilization, and abortion—but they do not have 
the right to be entirely free of governmental interference, and can be subject 
to fees, waiting periods, and informational counseling requirements.4
Parents have a fundamental right to determine many, even most aspects of 
the care, control, and upbringing of their children, but cannot make decisions 
        *    J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law and Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow, Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law.  Co-Director for the Center for Law, Society & Culture at Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law.  I would like to thank Catherine Wheatley for her excellent 
assistance with research and editing.  
 1.  343 U.S. 451 (1952).  
 2.  Id. at 465. 
 3.  Id. at 467. 
 4.  See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1694 (2008); Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A 
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261, 275 (1992). 
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that imperil the child to the point of serious bodily harm, such as choosing 
not to obtain medical care for a serious physical illness.5  The privacy 
doctrine has never ceased to be controversial, perhaps partially because of 
its dependence on context and partially because it is constructed out of 
“penumbras, formed by emanations from those [other constitutional] 
guarantees.”6
In addition to its legal meaning, privacy has complex and everchanging 
sociocultural contours, influenced by diverse factors ranging from individual 
hobbies and personalities to judicial opinions and enacted laws.  For 
instance, “the widespread practice of legally carrying a gun in public was 
facilitated by the movement for shall issue concealed carry laws.”7  In 
essence, our own orientations to privacy are incredibly subjective and in flux 
and may be even be contradictory across contexts.  We may go to great 
lengths to prevent others from knowing that we pass gas after eating broccoli 
or look up strange topics on internet searches, but care not a whit about 
reading HIPAA disclosures at the doctor’s office or share genetic data 
obtained through direct-to-consumer genetic testing services. 
Privacy claims thus have legal and social meaning.  According to Sarah 
Igo, privacy is “elastic,” and can function as “a kind of default right when an 
injury has been inflicted and no other right seems to suit the case.”8  In the 
past decade, there have been increasingly frequent attempts by individuals 
who espouse “gun rights” stances to fit the exercise of Second Amendment 
privileges into the envelope of the privacy doctrine, with varying outcomes.  
Plaintiffs have contended that privacy gives them the right to silence 
intrusive questioning from medical professionals, to have handgun permit 
holders’ identifying information protected from public disclosure under 
freedom of information laws, and to confer anonymity to litigants. 
This essay examines how Second Amendment enthusiasts attempt to 
strategically articulate a Second Amendment privacy interest in being free 
from interference from both governmental actors and private actors with 
ownership of, access to, or use of firearms, and with what consequences.  
Part I explores privacy’s status as a legal and sociocultural construct, the 
violations of which carry significant cultural, social, and emotional 
consequences.  It then explores the stigma that firearms enthusiasts often 
 5.  See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of 
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1991).  
 6.  Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 7.  David Yamane, The Sociology of U.S. Gun Culture, 11 SOC. COMPASS, no. 7, 2017, at 7. 
 8.  Louis Menand, Why Do We Care So Much About Privacy?, NEW YORKER (June  
18, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/why-do-we-care-so-much-about-
privacy (quoting J. Douglas, dissenting).  
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claim to experience, and discusses how they attempt to manage stigma, 
including claiming privacy rights.  Part II examines three cases in which gun 
rights supporters and organizations have claimed privacy rights, addressing 
doctor-patient counseling about firearms and firearm safety, disclosure of 
handgun permit holders’ identifying information, and disclosure of litigants’ 
identities.  This essay concludes that, while most courts have thus far 
declined to extend privacy protections to firearm ownership and use, they 
may do so in ways that confirm the stigmatized nature of the Second 
Amendment. 
I.  Privacy, the Second Amendment, and
Second-Class Citizenship 
A.  Understanding Privacy as a Legal and Sociocultural Construct 
Legally, privacy doctrine is a veritable hydra, with heads representing 
reproductive autonomy, family law, Fourth Amendment, and First 
Amendment bases.  The doctrine stems from Samuel Warren’s and Louis 
Brandeis’s seminal article from 1890, The Right to Privacy, which proposed 
extending laws protecting privacy in other situations to encompass the right 
to control publicity of one’s own information.  One branch of privacy law, 
following Griswold v. Connecticut, protects “decisional” privacy—the right 
to make certain profoundly personal decisions free from government 
intrusion, which has encompassed contraception, marriage, family 
relationships, procreation, child rearing, and education.9  A second branch of 
case law has focused on “informational privacy,” the right to control public 
dissemination of private facts, in contexts such as media publication and 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law.10  These two categories overlap; 
a woman has the right to be free from undue governmental inference when 
deciding to obtain an abortion, and deserves privacy in keeping this decision 
confidential.11  Although the decision to own, carry, and use a firearm is 
protected, Second Amendment privacy arguments primarily implicate 
informational privacy concerns. 
In a sociological sense, privacy is “the access of one actor (individual, 
group, or organization) to another,” “what people conceal and reveal and 
 9.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 927 (1992).  
 10.  See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U.S. 555 (1980), Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 11.  Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of 
the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2009). 
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what others acquire and ignore.”12  Privacy is influenced by laws that “define 
the contents, levels, and types of access that are legal and illegal,” social 
practices, technologies that “affect[] ease of access and structure[] who has 
access to whom,” and privacy norms, which “identify the characteristics of 
access that are deemed appropriate within a context.”13
Individuals’ attempts to manage privacy by controlling access to 
themselves and their information reflect “effort[s] to achieve [the appropriate 
balance of giving and seeking information] by complying with privacy 
norms and ensuring that others do not violate those norms as well as 
implementing their own privacy preferences.”14  Moreover, privacy is 
intertwined with social order.  Because visibility facilitates social control and 
affects behaviors, social order demands an “optimal balance between 
revealing and concealing.”15  Above all, “organizations, corporations, and 
governments, rather than individuals, have the greatest ability to access 
others and potentially invade privacy,”16 particularly because technology 
makes it easy and cheap to “gather, stockpile, and analyze information.”17
Privacy norms are violated by “levels of access that are too high or too 
low, access to the wrong kind of information, access through inappropriate 
channels, and inappropriate uses of information.”18  Though privacy norms 
vary greatly across persons, periods, cultures, and contexts, their violation 
produces certain predictable negative psychological and emotional reactions, 
with consequences for individuals and relationships; people who perceive 
their privacy has been invaded “may feel invaded or isolated, or they may 
feel that another actor is being too secretive or exposing too much.”19
Privacy violations influence trust in others and “essential social institutions,” 
and news of breaches can reduce confidence and perceptions of institutional 
legitimacy and security, prompting greater concealment attempts.20
Privacy’s maintenance, then, is intertwined with human emotions, which 
determine how we “construct these subjective private spaces,” erecting and 
 12.  Denise Anthony, Celeste Campos-Castillo & Christine Horne, Toward a Sociology of 
Privacy, 2017 ANN. REV. SOC., no. 43, at 251. 
 13.  Id. at 251.  
 14.  Id. at 252. 
 15.  Id.
 16.  Id. at 259. 
 17.  Id. at 260. 
 18.  Id. at 251. 
 19.  Id. at 251. 
 20.  Id. at 258.  
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maintaining “barriers” of “various cultural, psychological, and material 
factors.”21
Monitoring—and responses to being monitored—change in reaction to 
social relationships and technologies (Foucalt’s panopticon22 is a prime 
example).  The institutions that engage in monitoring activities are varied.  
Governments monitor citizens to “collect information to ensure compliance 
with relevant rules,”23 through observation, informants, and technology.  
Employers monitor employees to “protect company assets, control public 
communications and ensure that employees are as productive as possible.”24
Monitoring is more acceptable when it is “perceived as contributing to the 
collective good,” “contributes to collective safety and security,” or concerns 
out-group members and not one’s self, such as cameras set up in a city to 
catch criminal activity.25  However, such vigilance can inspire negative 
reactions when it implies a lack of trust, and when the people under 
surveillance feel they have something to hide.26  Disclosure of information 
can build trust and enhance relationships, but invites risk by enhancing 
intimacy and allowing opportunities for confidentiality.  As a result, 
concealment is especially critical for individuals who feel they are 
stigmatized, who “may seek to hide their discrediting condition to maintain 
their standing in a relationship.”27  “Patterns of disclosure [and concealment] 
“strengthen ties among group members and create stronger boundaries 
between the group and outsiders.”28
B.  The Stigmatized Second Amendment 
The ownership and use of firearms have been at the heart of American 
history since the Revolution; “gun ownership is normative, not deviant, 
behavior across vast swaths of the social landscape.”29  Nonetheless, “there 
is no sociology of guns, per se”; firearms as a research topic has largely been 
ceded to disciplines that analyze criminology, violence, and public health.30
 21.  Luke Stark, The Emotional Context of Information Privacy, 32 INFO. SOC’Y, no. 1, 2016, 
at 14, 17.  
 22.  See generally MICHEL FOUCALT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(1979).
 23.  Anthony, et al., supra note 12, at 253. 
 24.  Id.
 25.  Id. at 254.  
 26.  Id.
 27.  Id. at 256 (citation omitted). 
 28.  Id. at 257. 
 29.  Yamane, supra note 7, at 1 (quoting James D. Wright, Ten Essential Observations on 
Guns in America, 32 SOC’Y, no. 3, 1995, at 63–64).  
 30.  Id.
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 33 Side B      02/26/2019   14:13:21
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 33 Side B      02/26/2019   14:13:21
MEDEIRA_MACROED READY FOR PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2019 5:16 PM
560 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:3 
But American gun culture, now centered upon “armed citizenship,” has 
changed profoundly since Obama’s presidency and the watershed U.S. 
Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller,31 which held that the 
Second Amendment right to possess a firearm is individual in scope, 
unconnected to militia service.  These cultural and legal changes, together 
with accompanying increases in firearm sales, the visibility of gun rights 
legislation, and advocacy, have wrought profound changes to the Second 
Amendment landscape in the past decade. 
Despite their increased visibility and legal protections, firearms and gun 
rights advocates still face stigma.  Certain firearm types, accessories, and use 
typify “morally controversial leisure,” and guns themselves may be “morally 
controversial products.”32  In morally controversial leisure, participants often 
cannot “explain their activities in ‘rational’ language acceptable to non-
participants.”33  Collecting firearms may be linked to obsession and 
compulsion34 and unprogressive ideals, as “guns symbolize security, 
freedom, and wholesome recreation to a bedrock America that is at its core 
lower-middle or working class, small town or rural, less exposed to higher 
education, . . . conservative or tradition oriented.”35  Criminological or 
public health research on firearms issues connect them to crime, violence, 
and disease: “the more guns, the greater the spread of gun related 
pathology.”36  Sociologically speaking, then, gun enthusiasts have “a master 
status associated with undesirable auxiliary traits.”37
Gun owners may feel that others hold them “partially responsible for 
the very existence of gun violence,”38 and thus employ out-group stigma 
management techniques with non-enthusiasts to “avoid being perceived as 
morally or socially flawed by virtue of one’s identification with a particular 
stigmatized status or activity.”39  The most obvious way to manage stigma is 
to dissemble, or “pass,” among non-enthusiasts, exercising “strategic control 
over what information is revealed to, or withheld from, non-peers” through 
 31.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 32.  Yamane, supra note 7, at 4; A.D. Olmsted, Morally Controversial Leisure: The Social 
World of Gun Collectors. SYMBOLIC INTERACTION, Fall 1988, at 277, 278 (citation omitted). 
 33.  Olmsted, supra note 32, at 278.  
 34.  Id.
 35.  Id. at 281 (citation omitted).  
 36.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 37.  Jimmy D. Taylor, Gun Shows, Gun Collectors, and the Story of the Gun: An 
Ethnographic Approach to U.S. Gun Culture 148 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio 
State University) (on file with author).  
 38.  Yamane, supra note 7, at 4.  
 39.  Taylor, supra note 37, at 153.  
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selective concealment from coworkers and neighbors.40  Individuals who do 
not attempt to conceal their firearm-related interests can provide an 
alternative frame “within which potentially stigmatizing information is 
either neutralized or presented in a positive light.”41  For example, 
individuals can give “dignifying accounts,” justifications for firearm 
ownership and use including hunting ethics, the “calmness, discipline, and 
self-control required and cultivated by shooting.”42
Gun owners may also utilize “impression management” strategies, such 
as denying that their guns inflict harm on others; invoking commitments to 
idealized values like the right to bear arms or military sacrifices that preserve 
constitutional freedoms; panning non-enthusiasts’ moral failures, 
inconsistencies, and lack of knowledge; rationalizing their enthusiasm for 
firearms to distance themselves from “bad guys” or “bad guns;”43 and 
“identify[ing] themselves as deeply committed” and “knowledgeable.”44
They may be “extremely serious” about performing safety regiments, 
engaging in what Olmsted terms “dramaturgical discipline.”45  Significantly, 
unlike other stigmatized groups like the homeless and mentally ill, gun 
enthusiasts can “trade on his/her stigmatized identity at will,” playing up 
certain stereotypes that have positive in-group meanings (like “badassitudes” 
or stoicism).46
C.  Privacy as a Sword Against Stigma 
Social movements—many of which are organized directly to combat 
stigma—often make certain legal claims to gain legitimacy, social esteem, 
and social capital.  A movement gains social credence if it can convincingly 
claim to advance “civil rights” and eradicate discriminatory practices 
through protective legislation or case law.  People in search of civil rights 
are victims of oppression, often trapped in a complex web of oppressive 
social, economic, and cultural institutions and practices.  Those who fight 
for civil rights are heroes, “champions of social justice.”47  In civil rights 
litigation, law becomes a “tool by which they can force perpetrators of 
 40.  Taylor, supra note 37, at 153, 155.  
 41.  Id. at 154.  
 42.  Yamane, supra note 7, at 4.  
 43.  Id.
 44.  Olmsted, supra note 32, at 283.  
 45.  Id. at 284. 
 46.  Taylor, supra note 37, at 173.  
 47.  KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHT SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
VICTIMS 2 (1992). 
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unlawful conduct to comply with socially established norms.”48  Second 
Amendment advocates have recently begun to articulate civil rights 
arguments; America has a “gun problem,” with individuals who own and use 
firearms facing discrimination and loss of rights.  This claim appropriates the 
collective action frame of groups such as African Americans and women, 
turning the moral tables on liberals who are seen as traditional civil rights 
supporters—and gun rights opponents.  “Civil Rights” is a “master frame”49
that can “serve as [a] dominant ‘algorithm[]’ that resonate[s] deeply across 
social movements and protest cycles.”50  Thus, “by appropriating the civil 
rights master frame, the gun rights . . . movement[] seek[s] to culturally 
legitimate their claims (especially among liberal audiences) and to counter 
opponent organizations such as . . . gun control groups.”51
Law, too, is a master frame; claims of “legal rights” are a “dominant 
symbolic framework of rules, rights, and obligations [which] set[] 
boundaries on how collective actors conceive of their grievances and 
goals.”52  Thus, “disputes over the proper construction of legal symbols is 
likely to take place both within a given movement itself and between the 
movement and its external environment”—including the conferral of 
“rights” in the first place.53  According to Pedriana: 
[L]aw is a unique type of symbolic resource; it is not only a means
by which a movement can, by appealing to deeply resonant legal 
symbols, garner legitimacy and support for the movement.  Law 
in part also represent the ends of that process. . . .  Access to courts 
allows aggrieved groups to turn a symbolic frame into a legal 
claim.  And courts have the power to codify . . . those claims.  If 
successful, such legal change not only further enhance a 
movement’s symbolic framing efforts; legal change also 
transforms social and political relationships and thus have the 
capacity to exert power and influence beyond the movement 
itself.54
 48.  BUMILLER, supra note 47 at 2.  
 49.  Shoon Lio, Scott Melzer & Ellen Reese, Constructing Threat and Appropriating “Civil 
Rights”: Rhetorical Strategies of Gun Rights and English Only Leaders, 31 SYMBOLIC 
INTERACTION, no. 1, 2008, at 11. 
 50.  Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and 
Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC., 1718, 1718, 1725 (2006). 
 51.  Lio, Melzer & Reese, supra note 49, at 11. 
 52.  Pedriana, supra note 50, at 1728. 
 53.  Id.
 54.  Id. at 1729. 
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Recently, Second Amendment advocates have attempted to use law as 
a master frame to articulate individual privacy interests in firearm ownership 
and use.  The individual right to privacy is “another broad legal right steadily 
expanded by the federal courts throughout the 1960s,” one traditionally 
associated with issues very different from the Second Amendment, being a 
“legal frame more strategically equipped to symbolically represent the 
burgeoning national debate over abortion, and the women’s movement’s 
interest in expanding reproductive rights.” 
Redeployed to address gun rights causes, Second Amendment privacy-
seeking strategies have been particularly successful on the state level.  For 
example, in 2011 the Indiana General Assembly enacted the “Disclosure of 
Firearm or Ammunition Information as a Condition of Employment Law,” 
prohibiting any Indiana employer from requiring job applicants or 
employees to “disclose information about whether the applicant or employee 
owns, possesses, uses, or transports a firearm or ammunition” unless that 
disclosure concerns the individual’s ability to fulfill employment duties; 
employers also cannot condition employment or any opportunities or 
benefits upon foregoing these activities.55  Notably, there is no public safety 
exception, such as if an employee is an imminent danger to self or others and 
may have a firearm stored in his car.  Plaintiffs can sue for actual and punitive 
damages, injunctive relief, costs and attorneys’ fees. 
A Second Amendment privacy doctrine also maps well onto other gun 
rights virtues, such as individualism, conveying the message that the 
government needs to clear a protected space for activities associated with 
these rights.  Individualistic people are “defined as emotionally independent 
or ‘detached from community,’ and they tend to be self-contained, 
autonomous, and self-reliant,” and “do not rely on law enforcement for 
providing protection.”56  Pushing for privacy means that gun owners could 
behave as they wanted and have a right to be left alone while doing it.  That 
is a clearly productive way to both beat back the stigmatization that is 
allegedly associated with gun rights, and to secure additional social and legal 
space for firearms ownership and activities.  However, this turns 
individualism on its head, as the “good guys with guns” are now victims that 
need to be protected, although as a population firearms owners famously 
resist victimization on principle. 
 55.  Ind. Code § 34-28-8-6(1) & (2). 
 56.  Katarzyna Celinska, Individualism and Collectivism in America: The Case of Gun 
Ownership and Attitudes Toward Gun Control, 50 SOCIO. PERSP., no. 2, 2007, at 229, 231–234 
(citation omitted). 
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II.  Privacy in Firearms and Second Amendment Litigation 
Privacy claims have been raised and effectuated in several legal 
contexts, including legislation and case law.  Such claims have been directly 
addressed in three cases: Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida57; Doe v. 
Putnam County; Mager v. State,58 and NRA v. Bondi.59  Each touches upon a 
different aspect of privacy: the right to be free of uncomfortable speech 
touching upon protected Second Amendment rights, the right to prevent the 
public from accessing intimate information connected with the exercise of 
protected Second Amendment rights (such as names and addresses of gun 
permit holders), and the right to participate anonymously in a legal Second 
Amendment challenge to avoid stigma and harassment. 
A.  Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida: Do Gun Owners Have a Right to 
Be Free From Firearms Speech? 
In Wollschlaeger, the Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality 
of Florida’s Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act (FOPA), overturning it on the First 
Amendment grounds that it impermissibly restricted medical professionals’ 
speech.  As enacted, FOPA prevented medical professionals from asking all 
patients whether they owned firearms or had them in their home and from 
recording patients’ answers, with exceptions only for situations where 
particular information suggested such inquiries were medically necessary for 
a particular patient, such as suicidal tendencies.  FOPA violations were 
punishable by fines of up to $10,000, letters of reprimand, probation or 
suspension, compulsory remedial education, or license revocation.60
Shortly after FOPA was passed, several doctors and medical 
organizations filed a federal lawsuit against Florida officials, alleging some 
of its provisions were unconstitutional.61  In defending FOPA, state officials 
argued the legislation was enacted to protect patient privacy by “keeping 
private facts away from the public eye.”62  The NRA, in its motion to 
intervene, urged that FOPA protected “NRA members from intrusive, 
irrelevant questioning . . . and discrimination on account of their exercise of 
 57.  848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).  
 58.  Putnam, No. 16-CV-8191 (KMK), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169727 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 
2018); Mager, 595 N.W.2d 142 (Mich. 1999).  
 59.  Bondi, No. 4:18-cv-00137-MW-CAS, 2018 WL 1234695 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2018).  
 60.  Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1303.  
 61.  Id. at 1300. 
 62.  Id. at 1314.  
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Second Amendment rights.”63  Plaintiff medical professionals and 
associations, however, asserted that FOPA impermissibly chilled or 
prohibited conversations on matters such as routine firearm safety 
counseling that were important to injury prevention and depriving patients 
of their First Amendment right to hear censored information.64  This lawsuit 
gave rise to two rulings. 
Initially, in its 2015 ruling, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that patients had 
such a privacy interest, ruling that such “unnecessary” firearms questions 
were, in effect, bad medicine: “good medical care does not require inquiry 
or record-keeping regarding firearms when unnecessary to a patient’s 
care.”65  The court found that such privacy protections were needed due to 
power imbalances between doctors and patients, which could make patients 
feel helpless and coerced into answering such queries.66  According to the 
majority, FOPA’s legitimacy was grounded in physician adherence to codes 
of conduct mandating privacy and confidentiality, and negligence or 
malpractice.67
These arguments received little deference in the Eleventh Circuit’s 
2017 en banc decision, however.  There, the Eleventh Circuit stated, under 
an unchallenged FOPA provision, “any patients who have privacy concerns 
about information concerning their firearm ownership can simply refuse to 
answer questions on the topic.”  Florida had already significantly restricted 
disclosure of patient medical records, “and there is no evidence that . . . 
doctors and medical professionals have been improperly disclosing patients’ 
information about firearm ownership.”68  Nor was there evidence that 
“patients who are bothered or offended by such questions are 
psychologically unable to choose another medical provider.”69  Finally, 
patients have no right to avoid wholesale any questioning or speech that they 
found uncomfortable or controversial.70  The Eleventh Circuit observed, “the 
Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise 
protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the 
 63.  Proposed Intervenor National Rifle Association’s Motion to Intervene and Incorporated 
Memorandum of Law at 5, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, No. 11-22026-Civ-Cooke/Turnoff (S.D. Fla. 
June 27, 2011).  
 64.  Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Accompanying Memorandum of Law 
at 1, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, No. 11-22026-Civ-Cooke/Turnoff (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2011). 
 65.  Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015).  
 66.  Id. at 1214–15.  
 67.  Id. at 1216–18.  
 68.  Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1314 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).  
 69.  Id. at 1315.  
 70.  Id. at 1315–16. 
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unwilling listener or viewer,”71 and “doctors and patients undoubtedly 
engage in some conversations that are difficult and uncomfortable . . . many 
are those who must endure speech they do not like, but that is a necessary 
cost of freedom.”72
The Eleventh Circuit’s en banc ruling was a major blow to supporters 
of a Second Amendment privacy doctrine; law, as the master frame, had 
rejected privacy claims outright.  While it did not definitively exclude 
Second Amendment rights from privacy protection, it declined to extend 
them so far as to dictate how medical professionals counseled patients.  
Rather, it put the burden on patients to refuse to engage in such 
conversations, which could materially benefit other patients and prevent 
injuries.  This reveals the court’s assumption that individuals have the ability 
to assert control over their own information, regardless of the power 
imbalances inherent in the doctor-patient relationship.  Curtailing firearms 
counseling is a necessary public good, not a stigmatizing subject, and 
refusing to answer is a stigma maintenance strategy.  Ultimately, the en banc 
ruling places firearms ownership and use in the space of other controversial 
issues for which individuals must negotiate norms and in everyday 
interpersonal interactions and activities; just because Second Amendment 
concerns can be stigmatizing  is not enough to grant them privacy protection. 
B. Doe v. Putnam and Mager v. State: Do Permit Holders Have a Right to 
Shield Identifying Information from Public Scrutiny? 
On December 24, 2012, the Journal News, a New York newspaper, 
published an interactive map that identified the name and address of each 
person who held a state handgun permit in Westchester and Rockland 
counties.73  Thereafter, in Doe v. Putnam, anonymous plaintiffs and the New 
York State Rifle and Pistol Association challenged a New York law allowing 
public disclosure of gun permit holders’ identifying information on the 
grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to 
privacy and “impermissibly chill[ed] the free and uninhibited exercise of 
fundamental Second Amendment rights by subjecting permit holders to 
unwanted public attention and censure by those in the community who are 
opposed to guns and gun owners.”74  Plaintiffs contended that “the fact that 
 71.  Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1315–16 (quoting Erznoznik c. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205, 210 (1975)). 
 72.  Id.
 73.  Jason Horowitz, N.Y. Newspaper Posts Gun Permit Map, Starts Nasty Online Battle,
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ny-newspaper-posts-gun-
permit-map-starts-nasty-online-battle/2012/12/26/747ae7d6-4fb0-11e2-950a-7863a013264b_story.html. 
 74.  Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 2, Doe v. Putnam Cty., No. 
7:16-cv-8191 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2016). 
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a person is a handgun permit holder and is therefore exercising his or her 
individual Second Amendment right to armed self-defense in the home is a 
private, personal matter that is protected from public disclosure by the 
government under the constitutional right to privacy.”75  Evaluating these 
claims, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stated 
that the plaintiff had to prove that there was no set of circumstances under 
which the disclosure statute would be valid under the Second Amendment 
under intermediate scrutiny.76  The court agreed with the New York Attorney 
General’s argument that there is no legal authority for the position that such 
information is a private, personal matter protected from public disclosure by 
the government under the Constitutional right to privacy.77  Not all 
disclosures of private information will trigger constitutional protection; 
under Second Circuit precedent, such information was “in a limited set of 
factual circumstances involving one’s health and personal information,” like 
HIV-positive status and sexual assault.78  Thus, the court stated, disclosure 
of name, address, and permit holder status is not one of these very limited 
circumstances that implicated the right to privacy.79
In an earlier Michigan case, Mager v. Dep’t of State Police,80 the 
Michigan Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion.  In Mager, the 
plaintiff had asked for the names and addresses of registered Michigan 
handgun owners, but the State Police refused, stating that such information 
was private information that could be withheld from disclosure under state 
Freedom of Information Act exceptions.81  Under Michigan law, exemptions 
to disclosure applied to information of a “personal nature”—that revealed 
intimate or embarrassing details of a person’s private life, as evaluated by 
community customs and mores.82  The trial court held that such information 
was not private information: 
[O]wnership of a gun does not reveal intimate or embarrassing 
details of an individual’s private life. . . . gun ownership is a 
highly regulated area of conduct in this state. . . .  Defendants do 
not point to, and we are unaware, of any customs, mores, or 
 75.  Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 74, at 6. 
 76.  Doe No. 1 v. Putnam Cty., No. 16-cv-8191, 2018 WL 4757967, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
29, 2018). 
 77.  Id.
 78.  Id.
 79.  Id.
 80.  Mager v. State, 595 N.W.2d 142 (Mich. 1999). 
 81.  Id. at 143.  
 82.  Id. at 146. 
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ordinary views of the community that would lead to the 
conclusion that gun ownership is an intimate or embarrassing 
detail of an individual’s private life.”83
On appeal, however, the court overturned this decision, stating that gun 
ownership was information of a personal nature: 
The ownership and use of firearms is a controversial subject. . . . 
Further, knowledge that a household contains firearms may make 
the house a target of thieves, and thus endanger its occupants. . . .  
A citizen’s decision to purchase and maintain firearms is a 
personal decision of considerable importance.  We have no doubt 
that gun ownership is an intimate or, for some persons, potentially 
embarrassing detail of one’s personal life.84
Reconciling Doe and Mager requires accepting that there are competing 
perspectives on whether information about gun ownership (and, by 
implication, use) is intimate, personal, and embarrassing.  Doe implicitly 
differentiated sociocultural stigma from that requiring legal protection and 
rejected the assertion that gun ownership status resembled intimate details 
such as personal medical information.  Mager came to the opposite 
conclusion, citing that such details were controversial and could be 
embarrassing, even dangerous, in the wrong hands.  Mager demonstrates that 
law as a master frame is capable of recognizing a Second Amendment 
privacy claim, while Doe illustrates that this reasoning is contentious and can 
be rejected by subsequent courts, limiting its rhetorical and pragmatic 
authority.  It is especially damaging to Second Amendment privacy rights 
claims that the Second Circuit’s dismissal occurred in a context where 
disclosure could expose handgun permit holders to theft or other crime—the 
very rationale why most own a handgun.  This also suggests that permit 
holders’ safety was less determinative of case outcomes than each judge’s 
differing valuations of firearms stigma.  The Doe holding leaves gun rights 
supporters in a truly uncomfortable position: attain personal safety (and 
lawful handgun possession) by obtaining a handgun permit at the cost of 
disclosure or attain privacy (and forego lawful handgun possession) by not 
obtaining a permit at the cost of personal safety. 
 83.  Mager v. State, No. 197222, 1997 WL 33330940, at *2 (Ct. App. Mich. Dec. 12, 1997). 
 84.  Mager, 595 N.W.2d at 146–47. 
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C. NRA v. Bondi: Does a Legal Party Have a Right to Anonymity to 
Escape Stigma and Harassment? 
Privacy was also implicated in an ancillary open courts question in NRA
v. Bondi, in which two 19-year-old plaintiffs sought anonymity in contesting 
a Florida law raising the statutory age for gun ownership from 18 to 21 
following the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School massacre, stating that 
pseudonyms were necessary because of the suit’s highly controversial 
nature.85  Jane and John Does argued that they were afraid that public 
knowledge of their involvement in the suit would make them “subject to 
harassment, intimidation, threats, and potentially even physical violence.”86
The court record contained an affidavit from Marion Hammer, the former 
NRA president, stating that, after media had publicly identified her with the 
lawsuit, she had received harassing emails and phone calls threatening her 
life and physical well-being.87
The district court, while expressing sympathy for the plaintiffs’ claims, 
nonetheless found that parties to suits are granted pseudonyms only in 
“exceptional” circumstances to overcome a constitutional presumption of 
openness in court proceedings, such as being “required to disclose 
information of the utmost intimacy.”88  The majority first noted that 
anonymity had been denied in prior cases involving birth control, abortion, 
homosexuality, welfare rights for illegitimate children, sexual assault, 
substance use, attempted suicide, HIV infection fears, and for publicity-wary 
relatives of 9-11.89  It then clarified that anonymity was granted only in 
exceptional cases, and rarely for stigma or harassment: “the threat of hostile 
public reaction to a lawsuit, standing alone, will only with great rarity 
warrant public anonymity.”90  Finally, the district court emphasized that no 
court had ever deemed the Second Amendment or the rights it confers 
quintessentially private.91
The motion decision in NRA v. Bondi is the most troubling of these three 
cases because it directly imperils law’s legitimacy as a master frame.  Here, 
the court confesses that its hands are tied by legal precedent, and so it must 
rule that Second Amendment stigma’s potential consequences do not merit 
privacy protection.  Common sense conflicts with formalistic rulings.  
 85.  Order Denying Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonyms at 4–5, NRA v. Bondi, No. 4:18-
cv-00137-MW-CAS, 2018 WL 1234695 (N.D. Fla. May 13, 2018). 
 86.  Id.
 87.  Id. at 5. 
 88.  Id. at 8 (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 89.  Id. at 14. 
 90.  Id.
 91.  Id.
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Present here, also, is an important countervailing interest: openness and 
transparency in judicial proceedings.  Here, the consequences for gun rights 
supporters are more stark: either risk exposure and harassment to fight 
perceived injustice, or forego exposure and opportunities to reform the law.  
Stigma maintenance strategies are also drastically reduced for these named 
plaintiffs; they cannot dissemble but must openly acknowledge their 
involvement in such legal challenges—although they can certainly justify 
this participation.  And as the court’s own statement confirms, this 
justification strategy stands to be highly persuasive, even for individuals who 
may disagree with their legal arguments. 
Conclusion: Whither Second Amendment Privacy? 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v. Heller was 
intended to enshrine individual protections for firearm ownership and use, 
but thus far it has done a poor job of delivering on this promise.  
Consequently, the past decade has witnessed gun rights’ supporters’ attempts 
to attain additional legal recognition of Second Amendment rights, including 
under the privacy doctrine.  Privacy doctrine affords an attractive means for 
Second Amendment advocates to attain increased legal legitimacy for 
firearm ownership and activities, secure the social, cultural, and physical 
spaces in which such behaviors take place, and counter the perceived stigma 
associated with such behaviors.  To date, state legislatures have been more 
receptive to these claims than courts, with most judges being reluctant to 
extend traditionally narrow privacy shields to include problematic 
interactions with physicians, public disclosure of gun permit holders’ names 
and addresses, and publication of litigants’ actual names.  While Second 
Amendment activities are indisputably constitutionally protected, courts 
may accord them less weight than other intimate subjects for which 
(according to judicial reasoning or legal precedent) disclosure carries more 
profoundly harmful consequences. 
Ironically, two disparate conclusions could be drawn from these 
outcomes.  First, courts may conclude that Second Amendment claims lack 
the requisite degree of stigma to trigger privacy protection—reasoning that 
could suggest gun rights advocates have been quite successful in eradicating 
the stigma they claim to have traditionally faced.  Second, these rulings 
might be predicated on the assumption that gun rights concerns are innately 
less worthy of protection than others, confirming the Second Amendment’s 
second-class status.  As of now, however, we lack insight into which of these 
conclusions is most accurate.  Thus, the question of whether and how privacy 
doctrine overlaps with the Second Amendment is just one of many issues 
that have grown increasingly murky since Heller.
